The issue of accountability relates closely to that of corruption, which has received a great deal of attention recently in Indian political debates. In the absence of good systems of accountability, there may not only be serious neglects of duties, but much temptation for officials to deliver at high ‘prices’ what they are actually supposed to deliver freely, as part of their job. This ‘reward’, aside from being an example of corruption based on official privilege, can also deflect a facility from those for whom it was meant to others who have the means and the willingness to buy favours. Corruption has become such an endemic feature of Indian administration and commercial life that in some parts of the country nothing moves in the intended direction unless the palm of the deliverer is greased.
It is good that this long-standing problem has become a widely discussed issue in recent years, generating a good deal of public discontent. This is as it should be, for corruption is a huge drag on the economy – and more immediately on the lives of the people of the country. However, democracy demands not only that grievances about terrible practices be widely aired, but also that this leads to serious reasoning about what can be sensibly done to remove the problem. The temptation to ‘end corruption’ by summary punishment delivered outside the Indian legal procedures, which seems to attract many people (not surprisingly, given their frustration with the existing legal actions), may be hugely counterproductive. Aside from the possibility of penalizing the accused (which could be erroneous), rather than the tried and the guilty, the procedures of instant summary justice generate the illusion – a costly illusion – that something is being done to change a corrupt system that generates corrupt practices. We have to seek real remedies that work, rather than pleasing retribution meted out to the guilty – or the accused. Corruption is fostered and nurtured by the absence of systems of accountability, which cannot be generated by the favoured gross means of retribution under summary justice. Even establishing some kind of super-powerful ombudsman, with draconian powers that are not tempered by judicial procedures (as in some versions of the proposed ‘Lokpal Bill’), can generate more problems than it helps to solve. When a system is faulty, and gives people the wrong kind of incentives – to neglect one’s duty and to reap illicit earnings without systematic penalties – what has to be amended is the system itself. For example, any system that leaves government officers effectively in sole command – or oligarchic dominance – over giving licences (say, import or mining licences), without checks and invigilation, can become a minefield of corrupt practices.
What kind of institutional change could be considered and pursued? At least three different issues are central to the prevalence of corruption in public services. First, corruption flourishes in informational darkness: by nature, it is a secretive affair. An institutional change that fosters transparency and accessibility of information can be a real force in spoiling the prevalence of bribery and embezzlement. Second, corruption survives in a social environment of tolerance of misdeeds no matter how ‘moral’ people tend to see such misdeeds. A general belief that corruption is ‘standard behaviour’ and has to be tolerated unless the misdeeds are fully exposed and are unusually blatant can generate a situation where bribe-seekers are not under much pressure to reform, whether from others or from their own conscience. Third, corruption can be curtailed through a realistic threat of prosecution and sanction. But prosecution can be difficult to secure in the absence of witnesses prepared to speak out or of documentary evidence, and this can be a major barrier to suing or punishing a bribe-taker, which in turn tends to give a sense of immunity to the civil servants who seek – and get – bribes. There are also other issues involved (some of which were discussed earlier in this chapter), but the trio of informational lacuna, social leniency and prosecutional difficulty are among the factors that help to sustain a culture of corruption.
So what can be done about each of these underlying factors? There has been some genuine progress in tackling the first of these problems – that of hidden information. The Right to Information Act of 2005 has been a major step toward greater transparency and accessibility of information, making governmental affairs much more open to the public and helping to foster accountability as well as reduce corruption.
Though very widely used already, the Act still has enormous further potential, notably through wider enforcement of norms of ‘pro-active disclosure’ as well as of mandatory penalties in the event of non-compliance. Other technological and social innovations, including the rapid spread of information technology and (in some states) the institutionalization of social audits, have also consolidated this trend toward transparency. Here again, there are significant achievements as well as an enormous scope for further gains.
The second issue – that of social leniency – is also indirectly helped by greater transparency of information. For instance, the use of ‘naming and shaming’ demands naming before shaming can be attempted. Vigorous public campaigns and skilful use of the Right to Information Act, combined with constructive use of the media (including ‘social media’), can be of great help in this respect, as well as in altering public perceptions of what is acceptable and what is not. This approach has already been used with good effect in various contexts, from public scrutiny of the backgrounds, including possible criminal records, of electoral candidates to the analysis of tax returns or business deals of public personalities, and can be taken much further than it has been so far. Underlying the reluctance to make larger use of this remedial measure is both what can be called an ‘inertia of social norms’ (a subject which we will take up presently) and a belief – often implicit – that norms cannot change much until and unless some prominent prosecution with punitive judgement draws heralded attention to the transgression involved.
It is on the third front – effective prosecution– that very little has been done so far. It is, of course, not surprising that acts of corruption are often difficult to expose and establish with sufficient confidence to justify prosecution. But even a relatively small number of cases of successful prosecution, if they are stringent and well publicized, could have important deterrent effects on the incidence of corruption. Yet conviction rates are so ‘ridiculously low’ (as the Law Commission of India put it in its 160th report, submitted in 1999) that the Prevention of Corruption Act has not even achieved this minimal objective. The problem goes well beyond the routine difficulties of establishing guilt in corruption cases.
~~An Uncertain Glory: India and Its Contradictions -by- Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen
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