This essay seeks to reframe the policy debate surrounding the role of madaris in the production of militants in Pakistan and elsewhere. The main argument is that analysts must examine the human capital requirements of specific tanzeems, taking into consideration the objectives, tactics, theatres, and ‘quality of terror’ produced, as well as the preferred ‘target recruitment market’ of each particular group in question. Necessarily, this implies that some groups pose more risks than others, based on the scope of their operations, ties with other organizations (e.g. al Qaeda, Taliban), reach (local v. global), and lethality of operations pursued (suicide terrorism v. bazaar attacks). Such an analytical approach is more agile and affords more nuanced conclusions about the connections between education and militancy and about concomitant policy implications. Such an approach does not seek static answers to the madrasah question; rather, this approach permits analysis to evolve as groups develop their objectives, targets, theatres, and indeed, the quality of terror that they can perpetrate.
This approach permits the following conclusions. First, groups that operate in more challenging terrains, assail hard targets or attack targets that are either high-value or for which opportunity costs of failure are high are less likely to use militants that are exclusively madrasah trained than are groups that operate in easier areas of operation and engage either soft targets or targets with low opportunity costs of failure. Second, considering the prospect that madrasah education could confer some operational benefits – as in sectarian groups – madrasah graduates may be preferred in some operations. In other words, madrasah graduates may be suitable for some kinds of attacks but not for others. Third, even if madrasah students are more inclined towards jihad, madrasah students may not be selected by a given militant group if the group has other more desirable candidates to recruit. Militant groups could become more dependent upon madrasah students over time if militant recruitment standards change or if the militant recruitment market changes. Fourth, madaris produce religious entrepreneurs who justify violence and contribute to communities of support. Madrasah graduates also may build families that support some kinds of violence and may be the schools of choice for such families. In sum, this analytical framework suggests that madaris merit continual observation as they may contribute both to the demand for terrorism and to the limited supply of militants. For the same reasons, Pakistan’s public school sector deserves much more attention, however, than that sector currently enjoys.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The first section reviews the literature, laying out the various claims about madrasah enrolments, numbers of madaris, madrasah students’ socio-economic backgrounds, and – finally, and perhaps, most importantly – reviews the literature arguing for and against the connections between militancy and madaris. The second section looks very carefully at the various analyses of the presence (or lack thereof) of madaris products in militant groups. Drawing from this complex and multidisciplinary literature, the third section lays out a new analytical framework. The fourth section revisits the connections between madaris and militancy through this new analytical optic. The fifth and concluding section draws out the policy implications of this approach.
As noted above, despite the proliferation of studies of Pakistan’s madaris, many important questions persist. First, scholars have vigorously disagreed about the number of madaris and the penetration of madaris in the educational market. In the popular press, an array of reports suggested that anywhere from 500,000 to two million children are enrolled in Pakistan’s madaris, without any clarity about the level, intensity, or duration of madrasah attendance. The most influential – yet, still incorrect – account of the penetration of madaris in the educational market was offered by the International Crisis Group (ICG) in 2002. Relying upon interview data to obtain estimates of madrasah students, the ICG claimed that some one-third of all students in Pakistan attend madaris; however, those estimates were derived from an erroneous calculation that, when corrected, yields estimates that vary from 4 per cent to 7 per cent. This miscalculation is regrettable because the report is otherwise very illuminating.
In 2005, Tahir Andrabi, Jishnu Das, Asim Khwaja, and Tristan Zajonc published a study (hereafter referred to as the ‘Andrabi study’) that employed data both from household-based economic surveys (Pakistani Integrated Household Surveys, or PIHS, from 2001, 1997, and 1991) and from the 1998 Pakistani census as well as from household data collected in 2003 in three districts in the province of Punjab. The Andrabi study, without adjusting for bias in the data, calculated that madaris enjoyed a market share of less than 1 per cent. That is among all students enrolled in school full time, less than 1 per cent attend madaris. In contrast, the study found that public schools account for nearly 70 per cent of full-time enrolment and private schools account for nearly 30 per cent. It should be noted that the Andrabi study asked only about the kind of school attended not about the kind of education obtained. The Andrabi study did not adequately consider the fact that religious education is not the exclusive purview of madaris. Indeed, religious education takes place in public schools, under private tutors, in part-time mosque schools, and even in various kinds of private schools.
Since household-based surveys exclude some potential madrasah students (e.g. orphans and homeless children) and are somewhat dated, Andrabi, Das, Khwaja, and Zajonc adjusted their estimates accordingly for excluded groups and population growth. Accounting for these biases, they estimated generously that 475,000 children might attend madaris full time, less than 3 per cent of all full-time enrolments. The Andrabi study’s upper estimates are on the same order of magnitude as the ICG’s corrected figures, suggesting that madaris do not enjoy the market penetration that is widely believed of them.
Another serious caveat to the Andrabi study is that the data the study employed excluded various important areas of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and protected areas of the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), where madrasah enrolment could be much higher. The Andrabi study presented evidence that this may be the case: intensity of madrasah enrolment was highest along the Pakistan–Afghanistan border, reaching 7.5 per cent of enrolments in the district of Pishin. This raises the possibility that intensity of madrasah utilization could be just as high, if not higher, in all or parts of the FATA. For these reasons, the study could have underestimated madrasah enrolments, particularly in areas such as the FATA and restricted areas of the NWFP. The Andrabi study did not make any attempt to correct estimates for this exclusion, likely because there is little empirical base upon which such correction could be attempted.
A second area of empirical discord surrounds the number of madaris in Pakistan. In 2000, Jessica Stern claimed that there were 40,000–50,000 madaris in Pakistan; in 2001, Peter Singer estimated a number of 45,000, albeit with dubiety about this figure. The 9/11 Commission Report, citing Karachi’s police commander, claims that there are 859 madaris educating more than 200,000 youth in Karachi alone. In contrast, official Pakistani sources estimate that there were fewer than 7,000 madaris in Pakistan’s four provinces in 2000. Unfortunately, there are no definitive data sources in place to reconcile these different claims until Pakistan’s Ministry of Education completes its planned census of all educational institutions in Pakistan.
Yet a third area of empirical concern is the socio-economic backgrounds of madrasah students. Conventional wisdom holds that madaris are the resort of the poor students; yet, this claim rests uneasily upon the various robust studies of student socio-economic background that utilize 2001 PIHS data. [...] It is true that 43 per cent of madrasah students come from the poorest households (defined as those with annual incomes less than 50,000 Pakistani rupees [Rs], or U.S. $865 in 2001 dollars), compared to only 40.4 per cent for those in public schools; however, more madrasah students (11.7%) than public school students (3.4%) come from Pakistan’s wealthiest families (those with incomes of Rs 250,000 [$4,325] or greater). In fact, more than one-quarter of madrasah students come from Pakistan’s wealthier families (those with incomes of at least Rs 100,000 [$1,730]) compared to only 21 per cent of students in public schools.
...
Against the vocal assertions that madaris are ‘instruments of mass instruction’ and comprise an essential element of militant production in Pakistan and elsewhere, several scholarly articles as well as editorial pieces have sought to add a corrective view to the madrasah policy fixation. At first blush, many of these studies can be called ‘supply side’ because of their purported focus on the characteristics of militants who supply labour to militant groups. One recent example is afforded by Peter Bergen and Swati Pandey, who examined the backgrounds of 79 terrorists involved in five of the worst anti-Western terrorist attacks (e.g. the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 1998 bombing of two US embassies in Africa, the September 11 attacks, the 2002 Bali nightclub bombings, and the London bombings in July 2005). Bergen and Pandey found madrasah involvement to be rare and further noted that the masterminds of the attacks all had university degrees.
~~Pakistan’s Political Labyrinths: Military, society and terror -ed- Edited by Ravi Kalia
No comments:
Post a Comment