The death of Nāgārjuna was reported differently in Chinese and Tibetan sources (Walleser 1922). According to the Biography of Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna, the cause of his death was attributed to the conspiracy of a Hīnayānist who was deeply upset by Nāgārjuna’s radical refutation of all other religious and philosophical schools. Knowing his agony, old man Nāgārjuna asked this Hīnayānist: “Is it your wish for me to have long life in this world?” The Hīnayānist replied: “It is truly not my wish.” Hoping to fulfill the antagonist’s wish, Nāgārjuna locked himself in room and was found dead some days later (Kumārajīva, T.50.2047:185.a-b).
In this Chinese source, no explicit evidence points to the death of Nāgārjuna as a case of murder. According to a Tibetan Buddhist scholar Bu-ston’s (1290– 1364) account, however, Nāgārjuna was murdered by Prince Shaktiman, who tried to take the power of the crown. It is said that Nāgārjuna stood on the side of the king in the rather nasty royal politics of the time. Due to conflicts in the court, Prince Shaktiman cut off Nāgārjuna’s head with a blade of Kusha grass (Bu-ston 1931, 127–128).
A similar fate also happened to Nāgārjuna’s disciple Āryadeva (third century CE), who was killed by a Brahmin. According to the Biography of Bodhisattva Āryadeva, a young Brahmin, who felt deeply humiliated by Āryadeva’s severe criticism toward his teacher, vowed to revenge, saying: “As far as you embarrassed me with an empty knife, I will return you a real knife.” When Āryadeva took a walk after sitting meditation, this young Brahmin jumped forward and stabbed him to death (Kumārajīva, T.51.187.b-188.a).
Kamalaśīla (740–796), an advocate of the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika school who engaged in debates with a Chinese monk belonging to the Chan lineage was also famously murdered. The debate was held in the presence of the king at the Tibetan court. It is reasonably believed that the debaters had been involved with political rivalry. Tibetan Buddhists were split into two parties. One part, the Chan followers, was siding with China and the Buddha-nature doctrine, while the other was with India and the Mādhyamika view of emptiness. According to the Tibetan records, Kamalaśīla’s side won the debate. The Chan monks were driven back to China and their teachings were prohibited. Sadly, as reported by Bu-ston, four Chinese butchers, sent by the Chinese Chan monk, brutally squeezed Kamalaśīla’s kidneys to death (Bu-ston 1931, 196; Williams 1989, 193–197).
All three of these prominent Mādhyamika philosophers died as a result of religious violence. As stated in the above narratives, the question concerning us is how the issue of violence is accounted for in terms of the philosophy of emptiness. According to the Madhyamaka teaching, all beings, including self and things, are empty in themselves. The same teaching also applies to the case of murder—the one who kills is empty in himself, and the victim who is killed is also empty in himself. Even the killing itself is empty in itself. This is therefore the same as saying that murder is empty in itself. There is no one who kills, nor one who is killed. Then, who needs to mourn? Who is in need of mourning? (These are ethico-religious questions that will be addressed later in this article.) It is just like what Ārydeva told his disciples at the moment of his death:
In light of reality, who is wrongly accused? Who is treated cruelly? Who cuts? Who kills? In light of reality, there is no victim, nor the one who harms. Who loves? Who hates? Who steals? Who hurts? You cry because you are attached to the wrong views deluded by the poison of ignorance. It causes evil karma. As a matter of fact, he harms not me, but his own retribution through karma. (Kumārajīva, T.50.187.c)
A nihilistic reading of the notion of emptiness might easily suggest that, according to the above Madhyamaka account, the whole event of murder is nothing but a mere fiction. If this reading were accepted, the religion will inevitably be defeated by its own nihilistic consequence.
Obviously, Nāgārjuna is fully aware of the accusation of nihilism. In Chapter XXIV of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, an opponent accused Nāgārjuna of destroying everything sacred and profane in his claim that all beings are empty in themselves. The criticism can be summarized as follows. If everything is empty in itself, there is nothing either arising or ceasing. If there is nothing either arising or ceasing, there is no causation. If there is no causation, then it follows that there are no Four Noble Truths, for the Four Noble Truths are also guided by the principle of causality: the Second Truth is taken as the result of the First Truth, and the Third Truth as the cause of the Fourth Truth. If the Four Noble Truths do not exist, then knowledge, relinquishing the cause of suffering, cultivation, and realization of nirvāṇa would all be impossible. Consequently, no Sangha, Dharma, or Buddha exists. “Speaking in this manner about emptiness, you contradict the Three Jewels, as well as the reality of the fruits, both good and bad, and all such worldly conventions” (Mūlamadhyamakakārikā [MK].XXIV.5–6; Kalupahana 1986, 330). In short, the opponents claim that if everything is emptiness, then the law of causality will be untenable, because causation is possible only if it occurs in the relation of A and B, where A and B must not be empty. These realists thus argue that the theory of emptiness is not compatible with the theory of causation. Only if the theory of causation is firmly established can ethics and religion be securely grounded. For realists, such as the Sarvāstivādins, ethics and religion must be grounded in the metaphysics of essence/substance (svabhāva).
In response to this criticism, Nāgārjuna points out that the realists have wrongly understood the concept of emptiness to be mere nonexistence. As for Nāgārjuna himself, he takes “emptiness” to mean “absence of essence” (niḥsvabhāva). He denies the notion of svabhāva (essence, substance, existent-in-itself, intrinsic nature), but never reject the notion of existence (bhāva). Hence, Nāgārjuna claims that he did not destroy anything, including Buddhist teachings and the order, religion, or ethics. What he destroys is the metaphysics of essence/substance. Nāgārjuna goes further to argue that, on the contrary, ontologically speaking, everything is established by virtue of emptiness. If there were no emptiness, nothing would be established (MK.XXIV.14). In other words, everything can be said to exist in emptiness. This statement will not be difficult to understand, if the notion of emptiness is understood in terms of existence in causation without presupposing the notion of svabhāva.
On the other side, those philosophers known as Sarvāstivādins (of the Sarvāstivāda school) classify all existences with categories that, in the final analysis, are based on the notion of svabhāva. Although the Abhidharma realists firmly refute the notion of self, they nevertheless assume the existence of elementary factors that exist with svabhāva. That is, the notion of svabhāva is accepted by the Buddhist realist as the metaphysical foundation upon which all beings and their activities (kāritra) can be made intelligible. It is precisely this metaphysical essentialism that prompts Nāgārjuna to oppose the Abhidharma realists.
Essay: Emptiness and Violence: An Unexpected Encounter of Nāgārjuna with Derrida and Levinas -by- Chen-kuo Lin
~~Nothingness in Asian Philosophy -ed- JeeLoo Liu, Douglas L. Berger
No comments:
Post a Comment