Field Marshal von Kluge arrived at OB West headquarters on July 3, full of confidence and convinced that he would turn the tide of the battle. He proclaimed that Rommel would now learn to take orders and berated his subordinate in front of other officers for his defeatist attitude. It was well known that von Kluge held Hitler’s respect and had direct access to the Führer. Stung by von Kluge’s harsh criticism, Rommel sent his new C-in-C a lengthy memorandum of the problems encountered by German forces defending Normandy. It was not long, however, before von Kluge began to see these difficulties for himself. Visiting the front, he became aware of Allied air superiority. He witnessed the devastating effects of naval artillery fire in the coastal areas and was shown the destruction wrought by Allied guns with their seemingly unlimited supply of ammunition.
The unpleasant reality of the situation was further reinforced when von Kluge returned to his headquarters at St. Germain to find a new directive from Hitler concerning the conduct of German operations in Normandy. In this memo, the Führer predicted a second Allied landing and ordered the Fifteenth Army to remain in the Pas de Calais. Panzer Group West was to be renamed the Fifth Panzer Army and Eberbach stepped in to take over from Geyr von Schweppenburg, with orders to pull back from the front and make ready for a counter offensive. Hitler did not want to hear about the enemy’s artillery strength and “inferior” Allied infantry was to be overrun by surprise night attacks conducted without artillery preparation. Normandy was to be held at all costs, and although there were no reinforcements available, every part of France had to be defended against possible further landings. Under Hitler’s directive, the well-equipped 11th Panzer Division was scheduled to move from the First Army in southwest France to the Nineteenth Army on the French Mediterranean coast. Three times in July, von Kluge requested that the division be transferred to Normandy, where it was desperately needed, but he was refused on all occasions. Von Kluge’s reports on the lack of reinforcements and staggering casualties met the same response as had those of Rommel and von Rundstedt.
The heaviest fighting over the next few days was at Carpiquet, where the 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade attacked the town and airfield on July 4. The fighting around Caen was intensifying, and although the inexperienced 16th Luftwaffe Field Division was brought up to replace the 21st Panzer Division, von Kluge and Rommel decided that the Panzer Lehr would have to be shifted to the American front where the U.S. Army was advancing toward La Haye-du-Puits.
On July 7 the British began their assault on Caen, with 468 heavy bombers dropping 2,562 tons on the city between 9:50 and 10:30 P.M. Operation CHARNWOOD opened with a massive artillery barrage at 4:20 the next morning, using every gun in the Second British Army, as well as offshore naval guns. The 16th Luftwaffe Division’s defences collapsed before the 3rd British Division, while the 59th British and the 3rd Canadian Divisions advanced along a ten-mile front against the 12th SS, driving towards their goal of capturing the city and securing bridgeheads across the Orne River. When the Germans began to withdraw from Caen, the 12th SS mounted a rear-guard action to cover the retreat. The battle at Caen ended on July 9 with heavy casualties on both sides. Major General Kurt Meyer halted the 12th SS withdrawal in the suburbs on the south bank of the Orne, once again preventing Montgomery from achieving his full campaign objectives.
In bocage country to the west, the Americans had advanced only five miles in six days and were now encountering fierce opposition as they moved toward Périers. The bocage, or hedgerow, country in this area favored the German defenders. Each massive stone hedge, overgrown with trees and thickets, formed a natural defensive position from which German gunners fired unseen at advancing infantry. Tanks and infantry could move only from row to row, and were quickly exposed if they tried to use the narrow roads. As the British and Canadians occupied Caen on July 10, Bradley decided to pause and rest his American formations in order to replace the forty thousand casualties suffered to date. On the Russian front, the Soviet Operation BAGRATION, launched on June 22, was realizing tremendous success against Army Group Center. Germany’s line of defence in Russia had been shattered, and the Soviets now launched an offensive against Army Group North, tearing a fifty-mile gap through the German lines in two days of bitter fighting.
By July 11, the Panzer Lehr Division came into action against Bradley’s troops in the St. Lô area. Suffering heavy casualties, the Americans were becoming bogged down in the hedgerows of St. Lô and flooded marshlands of Carentan. Bradley called on Montgomery for help, requesting a ten-day respite in order to rebuild and resupply for an American breakout. Monty agreed to launch a British attack to cross the Orne and began planning Operation GOODWOOD, his next effort to break through the German lines outside Caen. A few days later, an ULTRA decrypt confirmed that the Germans were still awaiting a landing by Patton’s FUSAG, which they believed would be sent across the Straits of Dover and used to cut off the German forces in Normandy. Churchill sent the decrypt to Roosevelt on July 15 with a notation that “Uncertainty is a terror to the Germans.”
The continuing success of FORTITUDE, now five weeks after the D-Day landings, is also confirmed in a memo written by Rommel on July 15. He wrote to von Kluge that Army Group B had lost ninety-seven thousand men since June 6 but had received only six thousand replacements. Seventeen tanks had been sent to replace the 225 lost. Overwhelming Allied air and artillery superiority was smashing the German army in Normandy to pieces. He further noted that no new forces could be brought up to the Normandy front except by weakening the Fifteenth Army on the Channel or the Mediterranean forces stationed in southern France. Rommel asked von Kluge to forward the report directly to Hitler. The next day, Rommel also sought Hitler’s permission to withdraw the twenty-eight thousand German troops stationed in the Channel Islands. Hitler refused.
On July 17 Rommel set out for his daily tour of the front. After visiting the 276th and 277th Infantry Divisions, he continued on to Sepp Dietrich’s Headquarters, where he met with Dietrich and Meyer. Expecting a British attack within twenty-four hours, Rommel wanted Meyer’s 12th SS to support the 272nd Infantry Division. His daily tour completed, Rommel left in his staff car, but on his way back to La Roche–Guyon, he was spotted and attacked by two Spitfires. In the ensuing car crash, Rommel suffered severe head injuries. Unconscious and covered with blood, he was taken first to a shelter and then to the hospital at St. Germain. He would never return to the battlefield. Von Kluge was placed at the head of Army Group B in addition to his posting as C-in-C West. He moved from OB West headquarters at St. Germain to those of Army Group B at La Roche–Guyon.
As Rommel had predicted, the Allies renewed their offensive the next day. Montgomery’s Operation GOODWOOD, the largest offensive yet launched against German lines, was sent across the Orne on July 18, led by the British VIII Corps with the Canadian II Corps supporting the right flank. Across the river, the 1st SS Panzer Leibstandarte Division was dug in at Bourguébus Ridge southeast of Caen. To the west, Bradley’s American forces entered St. Lô that same day. Both attacks soon broke down into heavy fighting, with the British attack being brought to a halt by elements of the 21st Panzer Division. Eberbach had anticipated Montgomery’s offensive and deployed the forces of the I SS Panzer and LXXXVI Corps in four defensive belts nearly ten miles deep, with a fifth belt acting as a reserve.
Heavy losses in both men and tanks were sustained on both sides. For two days of bitter fighting, Canadian and British forces fought their way to the third belt of defence, but the German gun line on the crest of Bourguébus Ridge remained intact. On the afternoon of July 20, just as Montgomery’s troops were preparing to assault the ridge, a prolonged downpour turned the battlefield into a sea of mud, ending the siege with gains and losses for both sides. The battle had exhausted the German panzer divisions and prevented their transfer to the American sector south of the Cotentin. To meet the British and Canadian assault at Caen, two panzer divisions that had been moving to the American front were recalled. The Germans, however, still held vital ground at Verrières Ridge. Rommel’s defensive zone held firm but constant air attacks dropping twelve thousand tons of bombs were taking their toll. The demoralization of senior German commanders at this time is reflected in the Army Group B situation reports: “The extraordinary vigour and the colossal material superiority of the enemy in the fighting east of Caen on July 18 and 19 are indicated by the fact that he fired 103,000 artillery shells on the left flank of the 86th Corps and the 1st SS Panzer alone, and according to his own reports, dropped in our positions 7,800 tons of bombs from 2,200 two and four-engined bombers.”
~~Army Of The West: The Weekly Reports of German Army Group B from Normandy to the West Wall -ed- James A. Wood
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