Nanjing was the first treaty China had concluded with any foreign state for over one hundred and fifty years: since the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk with the Russians. But it was quickly followed by a series of other agreements over the next two years. It has been fairly argued that until 1839 it was the Chinese who set the tone and terms for their dealings with other countries. From 1842 that framework began, slowly, to change.
The most remarkable aspect of that 1842 treaty, though, is what it did not do. Given that China had suffered a complete and unmitigated defeat – indeed, the most decisive defeat the Manchu empire had ever suffered – the terms imposed were remarkably moderate and limited; a point largely obscured in the decades of condemnation of Britain and British attitudes which were to follow very much later. After a war which the Chinese claimed, and went on claiming, had been caused by Britain’s opium trade, the treaty did not mention it. Though the British wanted freer trade, no merchants or traders were involved in the preparation or conduct of the negotiations. There was not even any pressure to open up China to Western missionaries.
Palmerston’s demand to have a British ambassador installed at Beijing was tacitly dropped. Four trading ports, Xiamen (Amoy), Ningbo, Fouzhou and Shanghai were opened, in addition to Canton. China also agreed to accept foreign ‘superintendents or consular officers’ at each of them. Moreover, British and Chinese officials of corresponding rank would in future be treated as equals. Foreign consuls would be ‘the medium of communication between the Chinese authorities and the said merchants.’ 1 As for the old style of communication, those foreign ‘petitions’, which had caused such difficulty and resentment, would be replaced by using words like ‘communication’ or ‘statement.’ On the other hand, the consuls themselves would see to it that British subjects would pay the proper duties and other dues owed to the Chinese government. And ‘... the consul will be security for all British merchant ships entering any of the five ports.’
It was further agreed that in all of these ports foreign merchants ‘with their families and establishments, shall be allowed to reside, for the purpose of carrying on their mercantile pursuits, without molestation or restraint’. Furthermore, ‘in future at all ports where British merchants may reside [they would be permitted] to carry on their mercantile transactions with whatever persons they please.’ That tied in naturally with the abolition of the old Canton Cohong monopoly, and meant freeing foreigners to trade with anyone, to bargain about price, or to rent accommodation or servants, as they might please. However, it was accepted that if a ship was caught smuggling, it and its contraband could be confiscated or the ship banned from further trading.
Palmerston’s original treaty draft had wanted Britain to acquire one or more islands next to the coast, able to serve as a commercial and military base. The idea had been to have some piece of territory on which a British magistrate could properly operate to control British subjects; also a place of refuge. Territorial cession only came up once it was seen to be impracticable to have Chinese residents on any such British-controlled territory remain under Chinese jurisdiction. And once cession became the object, it was Zoushan that Palmerston had especially in mind. It had been recommended by the East India Company’s people, as well as by others who understood the China trade. It was ideally placed for the hugely rich and important trade of the whole Yangzi river basin and, beyond that, to serve as a base for trade all along China’s northern coasts. For all its hostile population and difficult wind conditions, it was sizeable and an important strategic asset. In the event, however, Pottinger, like Elliot before him, preferred the little rocky island of Hong Kong, with its deep, sheltered harbour and easy approaches. In spite of the fact that both Lord Stanley, now at the Colonial Office, and Lord Aberdeen, the new Foreign Secretary, remained unconvinced about it, foreign trade was centred at Canton and seemed likely to remain so. But circumstances at Hong Kong itself forced British hands. As Chinese merchants poured onto the island under British control, the British found themselves with a de facto Sino-British settlement on their hands. London finally accepted the Hong Kong acquisition by letter from Aberdeen on 4 January 1843, and Pottinger became the island’s first governor.
As for the indemnities payable by China, London demanded $21 million: $6 million for British property destroyed by the Chinese, $3 million to discharge the outstanding debts of the Hong merchants, and $12 million for the costs of the war. The money was to be paid in instalments over three and a half years. The Chinese did not argue about the figures. In fact, their negotiators told the Emperor that the relief from blockade and other pressures on China was cheap at the price. The debt, as well as the May 1841 ‘ransom’ of Canton, was paid in silver shipped to London or Calcutta – which may say a good deal about the ‘drain’ of silver from which China was alleged to suffer.
Trading taxes and duties were now set at around 5 per cent on both exports and imports, except for a 10 per cent duty on exports of tea, a commodity on which China still had a monopoly until the British got round to planting tea in Ceylon and Assam. In fact, Pottinger saw clearly enough that though the traders had complained long and bitterly about severe and eccentric Chinese tax demands, they did not actually know how much they were paying. They only knew about the overall prices-plus-charges which they had to pay to – and through – the Chinese merchants. Consequently the Chinese had no difficulty in accepting a British proposal for duty at 5 per cent. It was actually higher than the average of existing official rates, though less than the previous combination of formal duties and illegal exactions. Anyway, while the British insisted on reasonable trading conditions, they relied on a natural evolution of trade and other contacts to produce happier long-term political relations.
~~Opium, Soldiers and Evangelicals -by- Professor Harry G. Gelber
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